Henckell is my favorite cafe in Frederiksberg, Copenhagen. It is a local place with great coffee and sandwich. I feel cozy inside. It has only four small tables.
There is a tip jar next to the credit card machine on the counter table. Interestingly, it has a smiley face, two arms, and two legs. One day out of curiosity, I kept watching how many guests tipped in this human-looking tip jar. Afterwards, I also asked a server whether guests liked it. Surprisingly, I noticed that a few guests hesitated putting coins into this jar for an unknown reason. The server even told me that not few guests complained about the tip jar because its mouth is too small to insert coins.
When human flavor is added to an object, people like the object. It is supported by academic studies about anthropomorphism. For instance, when a car is anthropomorphized and its characteristics are congruent with the proposed human schema, people evaluate it positively (Aggarwal and McGill 2007). When a garbage bin is anthropomorphized (e.g., “feed me”), people follow the message and show prosocial behaviors (Ahn, Kim, Aggarwal 2013). When an innovative, uncertain product is anthropomorphized (e.g., “this little guy”), people tend to adopt this product (Jiang, Hoegg, and Dahl 2011).
However, anthropomorphism might backfire if the usefulness of the product is sacrificed. When I come back to this cafe, I want to draw a different character with a bigger mouth and see what happens.
People are often reluctant to comply with social causes because doing so may involve personal sacrifices of time, money, and effort for benefits that are shared by other members of society. In an effort to increase compliance, government agencies and public institutions sometimes employ financial tools to promote social causes. However, employing financial tools to induce prosocial behavior is expensive and often ineffective. We propose that anthropomorphizing a social cause is a practical and inexpensive tool for increasing compliance with it. Across three prosocial contexts, we found that individuals exposed to a message from an anthropomorphized social cause, compared with individuals exposed to a message relating to a nonanthropomorphized social cause, were more willing to comply with the message. This effect was mediated by feelings of anticipatory guilt experienced when they considered the likely consequences of not complying with the cause. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.
In this study, we adopted a food-waste composting campaign. A total of 104 undergraduates (54% female and 46% male; mean age = 19.8 years) participated in return for course credit. Participants in the anthropomorphism condition were exposed to a campaign poster showing a garbage bin with humanlike features of eyes, a nose, and a mouth alongside the caption, “Please feed me food waste only!” Participants in the nonanthropomorphism condition were shown a campaign poster in which the garbage bin lacked humanlike features and was accompanied by the caption, “Please put food waste in only!”. Participants completed a measure of expected compliance with the campaign (α = .89) using response scales from 1 (very unlikely) to 9 (very likely). In addition, we employed a 4-item measure of anticipatory guilt adapted from Cotte, Coulter, and Moore (2005). The four items assessed the degree of guilt, shame, responsibility, and accountability, respectively, that participants would feel if they did not comply with the campaign and were administered with 9-point scales (α = .89).
As expected, we found increased compliance in the anthropomorphism condition (M = 6.99, SD = 1.62) compared with the nonanthropomorphism condition (M = 6.24, SD = 1.80), β = 0.22, SE = 0.34, p < .05. Moreover, anticipatory guilt was higher in the anthropomorphism condition (M = 5.16, SD = 1.39) compared with the nonanthropomorphism condition (M = 4.49, SD = 1.64), β = 0.22, SE = 0.30, p < .05, which in turn resulted in an increased level of compliance, β = 0.45, SE = 0.10, p < .001. When we controlled for anticipatory guilt, the direct effect of anthropomorphism on compliance was no longer significant, β = 0.12, SE = 0.32, p = .17, Sobel z = 2.04, p < .05, which suggests that anticipatory guilt mediated the effect of anthropomorphism on compliance.
4 thoughts on “People tip less when the tip jar looks like a human”
4 thoughts on “People tip less when the tip jar looks like a human”